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JURISDICTION 
This Court granted Defendant's Petition for Permission To Appeal An 
Interlocutory Order under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) on August 20, 2008. (R. 
V4, 1490). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the production of non-party patient medical records ordered by the trial 
court, without notice to or consent from the non-party patients, violates Utah's physician-
patient privilege statute? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Discovery matters are ordinarily reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, 
but questions of law decided in the context of discovery will be reviewed for correctness. 
Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 121 P.3d 74, 76 (Ct. App. Utah 2005). Because 
both the existence of a privilege and the application of constitutional protections are 
questions of law, this Court should afford no deference to the district court's conclusions. 
Burns v. Boydeny 133 P.3d 370, 374 (Utah 2006). Likewise, this Court reviews questions 
of statutory interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's 
decision. Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469 (Utah 2006). 
1 
RELEVANT STATUTE 
The Utah physician-patient privilege, which is embodied in Utah Rule of Evidence 
506, states in relevant part: 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in 
confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a 
patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment 
provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) 
information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information 
transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and 
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or 
members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of 
the patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of 
the communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under 
the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was 
the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the 
privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a 
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional 
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an 
element of any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any 
proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of 
the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for Mental Illness. For communications relevant 
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the 
mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has 
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the 
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of 
2 
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or 
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise." 
(Utah R. Evid. 506(b) and (c)) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This -neal from the "h la> 20 2008 Oi der : f tl 1 s tin: ial coi 11: t grantii lg Plaintiff 
Denise Staley's Motion to Compel the production of the complete medical records of six 
non-party patients who, in addition to Plaintiff, were assigned to Nurse Angela Stallings 
during the night shift on Apr il 10, 2003 at St. Mark's Hospital ("St. Mark's"). 
Specifically, the trial court in its order found the following: (1) the Utah physician-patient 
privilege, as codified ie of Evidence 5H-- does not establish an absolute bar 
against the disclosure of non-party patient records; (2) the disclosure of non-party 
medical records is permitted if patient identifying information is redacted and a protective 
oulu lidiifh the wope ol (hi/ di HJOSUK:, and, (<) HK: I'kunlill • • lui tin non-party 
patient medical records in this case outweighs the privacy rights and expectations of the 
non-party patients. 
I Ni IIIIIC- ""' 'IIIIS Ml IM iii \ filed .1 Petition Ini I'nnnssinn lo Appi.'.il (lit1 Mw M), 
2008 Interlocutory Order ("Petition") in this Court. On August 20, 2008, this Court 
granted St. Mark's Petition. (R. V4, 1490). 
S I ATEMENT OF FACT S 
This is an action by Denise Staley ("Plaintiff) to recover for renal failure that she 
suffered after undergoing a hysterectomy at St. Mark's on December 10, 2003 Her 
null 11 inmpliunl I ill 11 uii Sipl imhu IS, ?00fi, .ilky.ui Ihuil "it Mark's WAS negligent in 
3 
that it failed to properly monitor Ms. Staley, timely notify Plaintiffs physician (Dr. 
Jolles)1 of her symptoms of renal failure, and timely react in response to those symptoms. 
(R. VI, 1-8). 
On August 30, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for leave to file a First Amended 
Complaint and a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Witnesses. (R. VI, 
252-264). Plaintiff was given leave to file a First Amended Complaint adding the 
allegation that "St. Mark's was grossly understaffed and lacked adequate nurses and other 
staff to provide safe and competent care to its patients," which constituted a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward the safety of its patients entitling Plaintiff to an award of 
punitive damages. (R. V2, 708). Plaintiffs Motion to Compel sought, in part, the 
production of all documents which show the total patient count and reflect patient acuity 
for Floor 4W on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003. (R. VI, 272). 
St. Mark's objected to both motions (R. V2, 396-474), explaining that Floor 4W 
does not keep documentation regarding patient acuity, and that the only way to 
extrapolate such information would be to produce the medical files of each patient 
staying on Floor 4W and attempt to develop an acuity assessment from those files. (R. 
V2, 689-703). St. Mark's further explained that it had already produced the staffing 
matrix, staffing sheet and patient census for Floor 4W on April 10, 2003. (R. V2, 730). 
While these documents do not contain information concerning patient acuity, they detail 
the number of patients receiving care, the number and staff providing care on the floor 
1
 The Order dismissing Dr. Jolles was entered on September 26, 2008. 
2
 Patient "acuity" refers to the amount of care and monitoring a patient needs for his or 
her physical condition. (R. VI, 271). 
4 
that night, as well as the ratios of patients to staff that deiemrine stalling (m (lui iiiul ,nl 
St. Mark's. More specifically, these documents detail that on the night in question there 
were c inn / nurses1 ,iiiul H patients on Floor 4W. (l n Of the 34 
patients, 6 to 7 patients, including Ms. Staley, were cared I'm (n Nui v Stall m p during 
different times throughout the night. 
'\ffer lln 11 M »f i« MI . In.nil In ni 11111 s hue led, Hie district court, ordered St. Mark's to 
"review the medical files of [Floor 4W] patients on April 111, I I, ..mini I ,\ ,2003,, and, if 
possible, to draw together data regarding patient acuity and produce a chart reflecting that 
data." (I I \ % 689 703) •• - vplained that, {s]i ich production will not 
invade the privacy of the other patients, but will provide the Plaintiff with the information 
needed to assess whether the hospital was under-staffed on the dates in question." (R. V 2, 
M<\) | lu, dislriel mm i JIKI pmvided I'l.ii «n (In1 e u u l ""^ I I t a l k ' s is unable to provide an 
"acuity chart," it "must produce a succinct statement, made under oath by an appropriate 
person, concerning how acuity is assessed and communicated between staff on [Floor 
4W]."(R.V2,695). 
In response to the district court's order, How-Su Chen, the current manager of the 
Floor A i ;;K Hospital, reviewed the medical records of the Floor 4W 
patients on April 10, n and 11, 20IH .iiiul inmitlril .in .tlliilii il detitilftiii hoi findings. 
(R. V3, 813-823). In her affidavit, Ms. Chen explained that staffing on Floor 4W was 
detern lined based on a continuing evaluation of multiple factors, only one of which was a 
3
 According to the Staff Matrix for April 10, 2003, Nurse Nancy Emero's shift concluded 
at 11:00 p.m. As a result, the patients assigned to her were then re-assigned to the 
remaining six nurses on staff. 
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patient's acuity. (R. V3, 813-823). Ms. Chen also provided the court with a detailed 
explanation of the acuity assessment process, setting forth the specific steps taken and 
multiple considerations which determine staffing. (R. V3, 813-823.). Ms. Chen then 
explained that any attempt to create an acuity chart for purposes of determining whether 
staffing levels were appropriate, especially years after the fact, would necessarily be 
"artificial and misleading" as it is impossible to recreate the exact circumstances and 
considerations involved at the time those decisions were made solely from the patients' 
medical records. (R. V3, 814). Nevertheless, because she was ordered to do so, Ms. Chen 
attempted to evaluate the acuity of patients assigned to Nurse Angela Stallings on the 
night shift of April 10-11 by reviewing their medical charts. Ms. Chen concluded that 
"[w]hile it is impossible to recreate the specific factors that would have led to the 
assignment of Ms. Stallings to those specific patients, the condition of those patients was 
consistent with the expected patients on [Floor 4W]. Their assigmnent to Ms. Stallings 
was an appropriate staffing level for a medical/surgical unit." (R. V3, 816). 
Plaintiff subsequently requested the medical records of the six non-party patients 
Nurse Angela Stallings cared for on April 10-11, 2003. On January 18, 2008, St. Mark's 
filed an Objection to Discovery, arguing that disclosure of the non-party patient medical 
records, without the non-party patients' knowledge or consent, even with all 
identification information redacted, violated the Utah physician-patient privilege, and that 
any information contained in these non-party medical records would be marginally 
relevant, at best. (R. V3, 889-993). 
6 
On May 20, 2008, the Honorable Kate Toomey entered an order granting 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and ordered the production of the complete medical records 
of the six non-party patients with identifying information redacted. (R. V4, 1216-1237). 
The trial court's ruling was made without notice to any of the non-party patients whose 
records were ordered disclosed. (R. V4, 1216-1237). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's ruling is erroneous and should be reversed because (1) the plain 
language of the Utah physician-patient privilege statute (Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence) bars disclosure of non-party patient medical records without the knowledge or 
consent of the patient; (2) Rule 506 provides no exception to permit disclosure based on 
the redaction of identifying information, and this Court has not, and should not, create 
such an exception where it was not provided by the Legislature and where the 
effectiveness of redaction is pure speculation and effectively ignores the patients' 
expectation of and right to privacy in their medical records; (3) St. Mark's has the right to 
raise the privilege on its patients' behalf; and (4) the evidence Plaintiff seeks is irrelevant, 
or at best marginally relevant, and is certainly not significant enough to eviscerate the 
privacy rights of the six non-party patients for a purpose having little or no relevancy to 
Plaintiffs malpractice action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Utah's Physician-Patient Privilege Prohibits Disclosure Of The Non-
party Patient Medical Records Sought In This Case. 
A. The Plain Language Of Utah's Physician-Patient Privilege 
Statute Protects The Six Non-Party Patients' Hospital Medical 
Records From Disclosure. 
It is an undeniable truth that each of the non-party hospital medical records sought 
in this case contains the very communications that are privileged and protected from 
disclosure under Utah R. Evid. 506(b), i.e.: 
"(1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or 
mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the 
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or 
mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis 
or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
Utah R. Evid. 506(b). Hospital medical records, which contain information regarding 
diagnosis and information obtained during an examination of a patient, clearly fall within 
the scope and purpose of the privilege. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles, 520 
P.2d 518, 520 (Ariz. App. 1974) (hospital records covered by the physician-patient 
privilege); Pina v. Espinoza, 29 P.3d 1062, 1068-9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (medical 
records which contain communications between physician and patient are within 
physician-patient privilege); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 727 So.2d 647, 
650 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (hospital medical records presumed to fall within scope of 
physician-patient privilege); Newman v. Blom, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Iowa 1958) (hospital 
records necessarily fall within scope of physician-patient privilege because "although the 
physician would not actually testify . . . the privileged matter sought to be barred would 
8 
in fact be effectually placed in evidence . . . . " ) ; Unick v. Kessler Memorial Hospital 257 
A.2d 134, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) ("To find that the written hospital records 
sought by plaintiffs are not covered by the privilege, as an oral communication would 
plainly be, would be to frustrate the intent of the Legislature in enacting a physician-
patient privilege in the first instance."). 
As this Court stated recently in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177 P.3d 614 (Utah 2008), 
"[t]he healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality exists to foster appropriate medical 
treatment of patients by assuring patients that their honest and complete disclosures of 
symptoms and medical history to treating physicians will be kept confidential" Id. at 619 
(emphasis added). Obviously, this fundamental purpose of the physician-patient 
privilege would be "rendered meaningless if it were destroyed the moment that a 
physician transcribed communications from a patient or knowledge he has obtained from 
his examination of a patient into hospital records." See, Tucson Medical Center Inc., 520 
P.2dat521. 
B. The Utah Physician-Patient Privilege In Utah Rule Of Evidence 
506 Contains No Exception For Redaction Of The Patient's 
Name From The Records Containing All Of Their Protected 
And Confidential Information. 
The trial court's order here effectively sanctions the abrogation of the 
confidentiality protections of the physician-patient privilege, leaving in its wake a 
privilege which now only entitles a non-party patient to the right to have their name 
deleted before their intimate medical records are interjected into a civil lawsuit and 
subjected to close inspection and analysis by complete strangers, all without the non-
9 
party patients' knowledge or consent. Deletion of the non-party patients' names and 
other identifying information does not avoid the statutory privilege. Indeed, the court's 
production order will still give to another person those patients' "diagnoses made, 
treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist," 
"information obtained by examination of the patient," and "information transmitted 
among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating 
in the diagnosis or treatment" - the very information expressly protected by the privilege. 
Utah R.Evid. 506(b). 
None of the enumerated statutory exceptions apply here to permit the discovery of 
redacted medical records. Utah R. Evid. 506 (d)(1), (2), or (3). As this Court held in 
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 377 (Utah 2006), the only exceptions to the physician-
patient privilege are limited to those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d). When 
applying the general rules of statutory construction, this Court has stated that its "primary 
goal . . . is to evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] 
the plain language of the Act,'" Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 
467, 469 (Utah 2006), by rendering "all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful" 
and avoiding "interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative." Id. This Court should "presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. 
We must be guided by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." Zoll & 
Branch, P.C v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). The maxim expression, unius est 
10 
exclusion alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, supports the 
view that the Legislature intended to limit the exceptions to those specifically 
enumerated. See Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 47:23-25 (2000). 
In Baker v. Oakwood Hospital Corp., 608 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. App. Ct. 2000), the 
Michigan Appellate Court vacated the trial court's order compelling discovery of 
redacted non-party patient records on the ground that, as here, the statute, as written, does 
not make an exception for redacted medical records. Id. at 475. The Baker court 
reasoned that "[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must honor the 
legislative intent as clearly indicated in that language." Id. This rationale squarely 
applies to Rule 506 as interpreted in Burns. See also, CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 
481 (Utah 1999) ("We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.")(internal citations 
omitted). 
Thus, although the district court noted the "two major schools of thought"4 among 
the several states as to whether redaction of a patient's name is sufficient to permit the 
disclosure of the private and confidential information contained in that patient's medical 
records, none of the cases permitting disclosure were interpreting Utah Rule of Evidence 
506 and the "specific enumeration" requirement for exceptions to the Rule set forth in 
Burns. Regardless of the rulings in other states on the issue, this Court should not create 
4
 For a compilation of the cases from sister states, see St. Mark's Petition for Permission 
To Appeal, at pgs 5-6. 
11 
a new exception to Rule 506 where the Utah Legislature has enumerated several specific 
exceptions, none of which includes an exception permitting disclosure of redacted 
medical records. 
Moreover, not only does the production of redacted records violate the statute, 
Plaintiff provided no evidence that redaction would actually protect the non-party 
patients' privacy interests. As the courts barring disclosure of non-party patient medical 
records have recognized, even if the names, addresses and phone numbers and other 
"demographic" information is redacted, the information containing the history of the 
patient's prior and present medical conditions, treatment and diagnoses could reasonably 
be used to identify the individual and therefore, redaction does not adequately safeguard 
their confidentiality. See Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 111. App. 3d 120 (2d Dist. 1990) 
(deletion of patient identifying information may not sufficiently protect the 
confidentiality to which the non-party patients are entitled); Parkson v. Central DuPage 
Hospital 105 111. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Whether the patients' identities 
would remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is 
questionable at best."); Wozniak v. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) 
(physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even 
with identifying information redacted, because risk of disclosing a patient's identity could 
not be entirely eliminated through redaction of identifying information). 
12 
C. St. Mark's Has The Right To Assert The Privilege On Its Non-
party Patients' Behalf. 
Hospitals have standing to assert the physician-patient privilege on behalf of their 
patients. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles, 520 P.2d 518, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1974); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital 435 N.E.2d 140, 142 (111. App. Ct. 1982); 
Unick v. Kessler Memorial Hospital 257 A.2d 134, 137 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1969) 
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006) is not to the contrary. In Burns, this 
Court held that the plaintiff-physician in that case, charged with insurance fraud, was not 
entitled to the presumption that he had authority to claim the physician-patient privilege 
on behalf of his patients because clear evidence demonstrated that he was raising the 
privilege, not to protect his patients, but rather to shield himself from a criminal 
investigation. Burns, 133 P.3d at 379. This Court held it would not permit physicians "to 
shield their fraud through the privilege" or to use their patients as "tools in perpetuating 
the fraud," further noting that "it is doubtful that patients have any expectation that the 
privilege would shield their records from law enforcement officials in a case like this." 
Id 
No such evidence and no such policy concerns are present here. St. Mark's is 
raising the privilege on behalf of the non-party patients who have no notice of this 
proceeding and are not present to raise it on their own behalf. Indeed, the evidence here 
is that a failure to enforce the privilege could be helpful to St. Mark's defense. See 
discussion of How-Su Chen's conclusions about patient acuity and staffing after the trial 
court ordered her to review the non-party patient records, Statement of Facts, supra. Nor 
13 
is there any basis to conclude that any of the non-party patients would expect the private, 
privileged and confidential information in their medical records to be revealed to 
attorneys, parties, witnesses or juries in a medical malpractice case in which they are not 
involved and about which they had no notice or knowledge. Nor is there any doubt that 
Plaintiff seeks precisely such confidential and private information. In Plaintiffs Answer 
to St. Mark's Petition for Permission to Appeal, Plaintiff specifically enumerates the 
precise and detailed information that she seeks to obtain and use concerning each of these 
non-party patients: 
1. Admission history and physical; 
2. Medication administration records for the Subject Shift and the prior shift; 
3. Nursing notes for the Subject Shift and the prior shift; 
4. Records of all physician consults conducted within 24 hours of the Subject 
Shift; and 
5. Discharge summaries. 
(Plaintiffs' Answer to St. Mark's Petition for Permission to Appeal, at pg 6.) 
Again these categories of information would necessarily contain the "diagnosis 
made, treatment provided or advice given," and "information obtained by examination of 
the patient," and "information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health 
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment" - in other 
words, the very matters protected by Rule 506(b). 
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II. The Plaintiff Has Failed To Demonstrate That Her Need For Non-
Party Patient Medical Records Outweighs The Non-Party Patients' 
Privacy Interests. 
Plaintiff has urged that her need for the non-party records "far outweighs any 
concerns regarding patient confidentiality." PL Ans. to St. Mark's Petition for Permission 
to Appeal, at 15. But even assuming "need" were ever sufficient to overcome such a 
fundamental privilege - and it should not be - this is not such a case. At the heart of 
Plaintiffs request for the six non-party patient medical records is her mistaken belief that 
without this information, she is unable to determine those patients' acuity levels, and 
without an understanding of those patients' acuity levels, she is prevented from 
evaluating whether "Angela Stallings had too many patients...." Id. 
Plaintiffs purported need for the non-party patient medical records is misplaced 
for three reasons: 
• First, because St. Mark's has admitted responsibility for the allegedly 
negligent acts of its nurses, there is no legal basis or reason for Plaintiff to 
assert a separate "negligent staffing" claim. 
• Second, whether Nurse Stallings was assigned too many patients is 
irrelevant for purposes of establishing whether St. Mark's breached the 
standard of care owed Plaintiff. 
• Third, even if Plaintiffs "negligent staffing" claim is not duplicative and 
derivative of her negligence claim based on the acts/omissions of Nurse 
Stallings, St. Mark's has already provided Plaintiff with the information 
establishing staffing levels during the relevant period. 
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A. Plaintiffs "Negligent Staffing" Claim Is Duplicative And 
Unnecessary. 
Plaintiffs claim that the non-party patient medical records are necessary to 
evaluate whether Nurse Stallings was assigned too many patients is misplaced. St. 
Mark's has already admitted that Nurse Stallings is its agent/employee. Because St. 
Mark's has already admitted its responsibility for the acts/omission of Nurse Stallings in 
her care of Plaintiff, there is no basis for Plaintiffs "understaffing" claim against St. 
Mark's. See Thompson v. Northeast III Reg. Commuter R.R. Corp., 854 N.E.2d 744 (1st 
Dist. 2006) (if it is not disputed that the employee's negligence is to be imputed to the 
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, then the cause of action for 
corporate or institutional negligence is duplicative and unnecessary. To allow both 
causes of action to stand would allow the jury to assess or apportion the principal's 
liability twice.). 
The reason for this rule is apparent here. If Plaintiff fails to establish St. Mark's 
nursing staff, including Nurse Stallings, was negligent in its care and treatment of 
Plaintiff, her claim for negligent staffing will necessarily fail as well. See Garland 
Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. 2004) (institutional negligence 
claim against a hospital is "inextricably intertwined" with and "derives from" alleged 
negligent treatment by physician, and thus "without negligent treatment, [an institutional 
negligence] claim could not exist"); Taylor v. Cabell Huntington Hospital Inc., 538 
S.E.2d 719, 725 (W.Va. 2000) ("While the appellant may be able to show that the 
hospital breached its duty to supervise Nurse Grim, absent a showing of negligence by 
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Nurse Grim, the appellant is unable to show that the hospital's negligence proximately 
caused her injury."); Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 722 (1st 
Dist. 2007) (citing cases for proposition that in an institutional negligence case if the 
physician involved was not negligent, then the hospital's alleged negligence in issuing 
him credentials "could not be a proximate cause of [plaintiffs] injuries"); Benedict v. St. 
Luke's Hospitals, 365 N.W.2d 499, 504-05 (N.D. 1985) (trial court's failure to properly 
instruct jury regarding hospital's liability for negligent staffing of its emergency room 
was harmless error where the jury found that neither emergency room physician nor 
plaintiffs personal physician, with whom he conferred, acted negligently); Beavis ex. rel 
Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 20 P.3d 508, 515-16 (Wyo. 2001) (hospital was 
not liable for negligent hiring of staff member who administered intramuscular injection 
to minor patient, nor was physician liable for failing to train or supervise said staff 
member, as jury found in separate trial that staff member was not negligent in 
administering injection); Humana Medical Corporation of Alabama v. Traffanstedt, 597 
So.2d 667, 669 (Ala. 1992) (verdict against hospital for negligent supervision of 
physician who rendered treatment to plaintiff was inconsistent with verdict in favor of 
physician). 
In her Answer to St. Mark's Petition, Plaintiff cites Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort\ 
808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991), in support of her claim that she is not precluded from 
asserting her "negligent staffing" claim against St. Mark's. Plaintiffs reliance on Clover 
is misplaced. In Clover, the defendant ski resort urged that one of its employees was not 
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of a skiing accident 
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wherein plaintiff was injured. It was in this context that this Court stated that 
"[rjegardless of whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for its employee's 
actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be directly liable for 
its own negligence in hiring and supervising employees." 
The critical distinction between Clover and the instant case is that, unlike St. 
Mark's, the ski resort denied respondeat superior responsibility for its employee's alleged 
negligence. Thus, the plaintiff was still entitled to pursue a claim for negligent training 
and supervision. In contrast, here St. Mark's has already admitted its respondeat superior 
responsibility for the actions of its employees, including Nurse Stallings. Thus, if 
Plaintiff proves that Nurse Stallings was negligent in her monitoring and reporting of 
Mrs. Staley's conditions, St. Mark's will admittedly be liable for that negligence. 
Conversely, if Plaintiff fails to prove Nurse Stallings was negligent, her "negligent 
staffing" claims would necessarily fail as well. Certainly, such a duplicative and 
unnecessary claim does not afford a proper basis to violate the physician-patient privilege 
set forth in Rule 506. 
B. The Non-Party Patient Medical Records Are Not Relevant To 
Plaintiffs Underlying Negligence Claim. 
Nor are the non-party patients' records relevant to Plaintiffs claims that Nurse 
Stallings was negligent. St. Mark's has not claimed that Nurse Stallings was prevented 
from attending to Plaintiff because she was too busy with other patients who were in 
more serious condition. Thus, the only relevant issue is whether Nurse Stallings' 
monitoring and reporting of Plaintiffs condition fell within the standard of care. That 
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determination does not require an examination of the intimate and personal medical 
records of any non-party patients, but rather requires an examination of Plaintiffs own 
medical records, the testimony of Nurse Stallings and others involved in Plaintiffs care 
and expert testimony as to what the standard of care required. See e.g., Roe v. Planned 
Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 878 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (non-
party patient medical records irrelevant to establish whether defendant violated Ohio law 
in treatment of minor). 
C. St. Mark's Has Already Produced An Abundance Of Evidence 
Relevant To The Staffing Issue, 
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs belated negligent staffing allegations 
properly allege a separate and cognizable cause of action - they do not - Plaintiff has 
unfettered access to other evidence directly relating to the issue of staffing on 4W on 
April 10, 2003 - including the charge reports, patient census information and staff matrix 
previously provided to Plaintiff. These materials provide the clearest and most accurate 
picture of staffing on April 10, 2003. Therefore, Plaintiff already has the relevant 
information necessary to accurately assess the nurse to patient ratio on the night in 
question without impinging upon the privacy rights of any non-party patient, thereby 
eviscerating any need for the production of non-party patient medical records. 
A similar scenario occurred in Yoe v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2003 WL 
549923 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). There, despite being provided with the Clinic's Operating 
Room Schedule for the day in question, the plaintiffs sought production of non-party 
patients' medical records in an effort to prove the defendant physician was operating on 
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more than one patient simultaneously, thus breaching the standard of care owed to the 
plaintiff. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their 
need for the non-party patients' records outweighed the non-party patients' privacy 
interests, and upheld the trial court's denial of their request. The court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs had access to information in support of this theory of the case from sources 
other than non-party patient medical records, as well as an opportunity to cross-examine 
relevant witnesses regarding the defendant physician's whereabouts during the day in 
questions. Ttf. at 3. 
Like in Yoe, Plaintiff here has access to a myriad of information concerning the 
staffing on 4W from many sources other than the non-party patients' medical records, 
without impinging upon the non-party patients' privacy rights protected by Rule 506. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should hold that the Utah physician-
patient privilege bars any disclosure of the contents of the six non-party patient medical 
records at issue in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
HXAQU 
Onk of the atturnqys for Northern Utah 
Healthcare Corp. d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital 
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